

# 16-74 TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

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
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## UNGA SESSION

### TENG SPEECH CONFIRMS PRC ACTIVIST, OPEN FOREIGN POLICY

Teng Hsiao-ping's 10 April speech to the UNGA special session provided a new and broader framework for Peking's claim of kinship with developing countries while reaffirming that Peking is not turning away from its recent closer relations with the West. Teng also affirmed that the current PRC anti-Confucius ideological campaign will not cause a retreat from the international scene--as did the cultural revolution--but that it will instead serve to maintain the revolutionary activism of PRC foreign policy during the current favorable period of "great disorder under heaven." Both the United States and the USSR came under attack as superpowers bullying the smaller countries, but Teng continued the recent PRC practice of treating the USSR in far harsher terms.

In noting the "drastic division and realinement" in the world, Teng referred to the breakup of the "socialist camp" and the disintegration of the "Western imperialist bloc," recalling the thesis of the authoritative 1972 New Year's Day joint editorial which had stressed the regrouping of international forces to rationalize Peking's invitation to President Nixon and other moves in foreign relations. Reiterating Peking's premise that U.S.-Soviet rivalry is irreconcilable--the paramount "contradiction" of the present age, and the chief cause of world disorder--Teng implicitly reaffirmed that Peking sees ample opportunities for continued Chinese maneuvering in the triangular relationship.

The circumstances surrounding Teng's presence at the United Nations serve to underscore his address as a major statement of PRC foreign policy aims. The speech is the first by a member of the PRC Politburo in a Western country since the cultural revolution. Peking also acted to present Teng as the envoy of a united PRC leadership, not a particular faction, by providing him with a high-level farewell ceremony in Peking, attended by almost all active, Peking-based Politburo leaders.\*

PRC-THIRD WORLD  
SOLIDARITY

Teng carefully stuck to the framework of the flexible Chouist foreign policy of recent years, stressing that the present situation is one in which "international relations are changing drastically," but added the notion that international regrouping has now reached

\* Teng's departure is discussed in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, page 27.

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the point where "three worlds" have been formed: one consisting of the United States and the Soviet Union; one, made up of China and other developing states; and one representing developed states that sometimes oppress developing nations but which in turn are subject to oppression by one or both superpowers. Teng's groupings represent a departure from Peking's previous, longstanding framework which held that China and its socialist allies were on one side, the imperialist powers led by the United States and the USSR were on the other, and between them lay two "intermediate zones": one made up of developing, non-socialist third world states and the other of developed nations such as France that were opposed to superpower dominance.

Peking had been moving gradually in the direction of Teng's view over the past few years, with spokesmen noting in particular the growing unity of the "small and medium-sized countries" against the superpowers. Chou En-lai in his 24 August 1973 report to the 10th CCP Congress called on world nations to form the "broadest united front" against the superpowers.

An effect of Teng's new division is to drop Peking's former insistence on socialist credentials for its close allies, and thereby open the way for more intimate Chinese unity with the entire third world. In portraying an attractive image for the developing nations, Teng was at pains to demonstrate PRC solidarity with them and all oppressed nations and peoples, and to show China's determination not to become a superpower. In this regard, Teng referred to the cultural revolution and to the current domestic campaign against Confucius and Lin Piao as designed in part to insure that Peking, while pursuing a greater role on the international scene through flexible policies, will not lose its bearings as a socialist state committed to third world interests.

On issues of specific import to the developing nations at the session, Teng lauded the Arab use of the oil weapon during the Middle East war as a model for third world struggles and broadly supported moves to safeguard political independence and sovereignty over resources. He took a more moderate stand than some speakers by avoiding a blanket call for nationalization, but asserting support for steps to control foreign influence "up to and including nationalization." He also stated that developing countries should "gradually shake off control of foreign capital." Teng assumed a flexible attitude toward the role of trade and foreign exchanges-- subjects of supposed debate within the Chinese leadership. The vice premier stuck to Peking's stress on self-reliance but also affirmed the Chinese belief that this in no way means "self-seclusion" or rejection of foreign exchanges on an equitable basis.

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**SINO-SOVIET ISSUES** While generally softpedaling criticism of the United States, Teng strove to isolate Moscow with a tough indictment of Moscow's international economic policies. Teng attacked Moscow's advocacy of "international division of labor," its economic domination in East Europe, its use of joint enterprises abroad, its aid policies--especially in the Middle East--and its alleged thesis that a country's sovereignty over its resources depends upon its ability to exploit and use those resources. Teng's criticisms cap a series of major PEOPLE'S DAILY and NCNA commentaries leading up to the special session that have been designed to show the developing nations that the Soviet Union is not only a military and political threat to their security but an economic superpower as well.

**BACKGROUND** Teng's speech climaxed a period of increasing Chinese attention to and support for third world countries and oppressed peoples generally. This emphasis became particularly manifest after the PRC leadership's consultations with visiting Algerian President Boumediene in February, following his call for the UNGA special session. Since then Chinese leaders have taken pains to display to third world visitors PRC solidarity with their cause, suggesting that China may have been tailoring its recent foreign policy comment with an eye to making a splash at the UNGA session. Chou En-lai, in a 24 March banquet speech for Tanzanian President Nyerere, strongly reaffirmed Peking's "bounden proletarian internationalist duty" to support oppressed nations and peoples, while Wang Hung-wen in a 3 April rally speech for visiting Cambodians disclosed a new Mao instruction regarding Chinese duty to help world struggles.

Peking's effort reflects the continuing concern of Chinese leaders to balance China's various world constituencies and retain revolutionary credentials, while flexibly pursuing broader goals abroad. From time to time over the past few years of developing detente with Washington and pragmatic international contacts, the Chinese have striven to reassert their credentials as supporters of revolutionary movements. For example, following public indications of movement in Sino-U.S. relations in late 1970, Chou, in a March 1971 rally speech in Hanoi, reported a new Mao instruction testifying to Chinese support for revolution abroad. Similarly, a month after President Nixon's visit in February 1972, Chou affirmed in a banquet speech for Prince Sihanouk that China regarded continued support for world revolution a "bounden internationalist duty."

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NCNA TREATMENT  
OF SESSION

NCNA and other Chinese media have given full coverage to Teng's activities and to his UNGA address. NCNA promptly reported Secretary Kissinger's 14 April banquet for Teng and his assistants, Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua and Permanent UN representative Huang Hua. Like NCNA's coverage of a comparable banquet given by Kissinger for Chiao Kuan-hua during the regular UNGA session last October, there was no characterization of the atmosphere.

NCNA's coverage of Kissinger's 15 April UNGA speech routinely criticized his call for continued international "interdependence" and his remarks on the Arab oil embargo, charging that he had "threatened" third world countries with retaliation if they used control of resources to exert international pressure. NCNA gave similarly critical coverage to Gromyko's 11 April low key address, rebutting his claim that Moscow is the natural ally of developing countries and noting his alleged unease over the exposure of Moscow's "superpower hegemonism" at the session.

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## GROMYKO REAFFIRMS SOVIET VIEWS ON ENERGY, WORLD SITUATION

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's 11 April address to the UNGA special session, as reported in PRAVDA on the 12th, broke no new ground on issues nominally on the agenda. He restated previously announced Soviet positions on the causes of the world energy shortage, the right of developing countries to exercise full sovereignty over their natural resources and Moscow's willingness to participate in a broad international effort to examine energy problems. Given the forum, the most significant aspect of Gromyko's remarks was rather his own affirmation of the continuity in Soviet foreign policy, as evidenced in his attempt to place the immediate resource issues under discussion in the context of broader Soviet concerns about detente and international economic cooperation. Moscow had earlier shown signs of mixed emotions about the UNGA session, undoubtedly due in part to the expectation that Peking and a number of the nonaligned states would use the occasion to attack Soviet policies. Reflecting this concern, the thrust of Gromyko's effort was to defend the Soviet role in the third world while shifting the focus of UN discussion to areas where Moscow has traditionally felt more comfortable and in which Soviet policies could be more easily defended.

While responding only indirectly to Teng Hsiao-ping's earlier barbs and making perfunctory comments about the sinister role of "monopoly capital" and "neocolonialism," Gromyko moved on quickly to point out that the session was being held in conditions of "deepening detente" and indeed that the improved international situation had made such a meeting possible. He cautioned that any recommendations emanating from the session should "accord with the interests of further improving the international situation." Echoing a persistent Soviet complaint at recent UN sessions, Gromyko urged that, in discussing narrower economic and social issues, the delegates not lose sight of the fact that "concern for peace" remains the "main UN task." In that regard it was noteworthy that his only specific recommendation regarding any resolution adopted by the session was that it attach "due significance" to "tasks of preventing war and preserving peace."

Gromyko took advantage of the session's focus on international economic relations to reaffirm Moscow's interest in expanded international economic cooperation. Twice noting the need for a "restructuring" of international economic relationships, Gromyko pointed to Soviet industrial and scientific might and

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to a "large domestic market" as evidence of Soviet potential for participation in such expanded international exchange. Gromyko offered a guarded assessment of East-West economic exchanges to date, noting that while progress is being made "step by step," much remains to be done.

While breaking little new ground on energy, Gromyko put an authoritative stamp on earlier Soviet statements and analyses. He argued that the origins of the recent energy shortage lay not in natural but in social and political causes--including Israeli policies in the Middle East and a history of Western "plundering" of the oil reserves of producing countries. He pointedly observed, in this connection, that the socialist countries had been "hardly affected." He also denied that the oil-producing states could be blamed for exerting sovereignty over their own resources and gave implicit support for the Arab oil embargo. He did, however, say that Moscow does not favor an embargo "for its own sake" and conceded that "an aggravation of the oil problem" could cause a "new flareup in international tension." Gromyko did not make more specific Moscow's rather vague hints about its own ideas for a solution to energy problems. He did, however, reaffirm earlier Soviet statements, including his own in Paris on 18 February, in arguing that any solution should combine the efforts of "a broad circle of states" and in stating Moscow's "readiness to participate both in bilateral and in multilateral discussions."

REACTION TO  
TENG, KISSINGER

Following the lead of TASS commentator Mikhail Yakovlev on 11 April, Moscow broadcasts to the third world were quick to take issue with Teng Hsiao-ping's 10 April broadside at Soviet policy. Yakovlev concluded that the Teng speech constituted clear evidence the main aim of the Chinese delegation to the session was "to attack slanderously the Soviet Union's foreign policy and undermine relations between the Soviet Union and other socialist states and the developing countries." Radio commentaries went on to point out that Moscow had expected nothing less from a "veteran anti-Soviet" figure like Teng and that Peking's tactics played directly into the hands of imperialistic interests.

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Not surprisingly, Moscow has sustained a hands-off policy toward Secretary of State Kissinger's 15 April address. A TASS report of that day's developments at the session concluded with a brief report on his remarks. Correspondent Yuriy Romantsev noted both Kissinger's "emphatic" point that a solution to these problems was possible under only conditions of detente and his "barrage of attacks" on developing countries for their efforts to unite to influence world prices for raw materials. Commentary on the session has ignored Kissinger's remarks and gone on to attack only in general terms "imperialist" economic policy in the third world.

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## U S S R - S Y R I A

### MOSCOW GREETS PRESIDENT AL-ASAD WITH CEREMONIAL FLOURISHES

Moscow provided some unusual ceremonial flourishes to underscore the importance it wished to be attached to Syrian President al-Asad's 11-16 April "friendly official" visit to the Soviet Union at the head of a party-government delegation. The treatment was presumably contrived to impress Washington and Cairo as well as al-Asad himself. Brezhnev, Podgornyy and Kosygin showed up to greet al-Asad on his arrival in Moscow and the same leaders saw him off on the 13th for visits to Volgograd and Tashkent en route home. The airport ceremonies were carried live on radio and television—an unusual treatment not known to have been accorded previous Arab visitors. And the concluding document was dressed up as a joint statement signed by Brezhnev and al-Asad, whereas most such Soviet-Arab documents have been issued unsigned.\*

PROGRAM OF VISIT      Apart from these ceremonial extras, al-Asad's visit followed much the same pattern as that of his last official visit in July 1972.\*\* On both occasions he was preceded by an economic delegation for advance talks. In 1972, he had been met by Podgornyy and Kosygin; Brezhnev did not join these talks until the second day. On the current visit, all three Soviet leaders participated in the two sessions of the talks on the 11th and the 12th. Brezhnev spoke at a dinner on the 11th for al-Asad, greeting him as an "outstanding political leader of the Arab world," and Podgornyy spoke at a luncheon given by al-Asad the next day, also attended by Brezhnev and Kosygin.

On both visits, agreements were signed on the third day and al-Asad left Moscow—in 1972, for an overnight stopover in Sochi on his way to Cairo, and this year for visits to

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\* Khrushchev signed communiquees with Ben Bella on the Algerian leader's visit to the USSR in May 1964, and with Nasir on his visit to Cairo later that same month. Kosygin and Boumediene also signed a joint statement on the former's visit to Algeria in October 1971.

\*\* The 1972 visit is discussed in the FBIS TRENDS of 12 July 1972, pages 29-33.

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Volgograd and Tashkent en route home. The documents signed this year included the joint statement, a plan of party ties for 1974, a long-term economic-technical cooperation agreement, a cultural-scientific cooperation plan for 1974 and a protocol on trade for 1974.

Moscow also took the unusual step of providing al-Asad an opportunity to address the Soviet public in a speech over Moscow television--an honor that has been accorded President Nixon and West European, but not Arab, leaders. According to Damascus radio, the speech was delivered on the 12th, and it was reported by TASS and broadcast by Moscow in Arabic on the 14th. On the 1972 visit he was interviewed by a Moscow radio and television correspondent; this interview was reported by TASS and Moscow's Arabic service, but there were no reports that it was televised.

BREZHNEV SPEECH      Brezhnev in his dinner speech on the 11th warned against the substitution of "partial solutions" for an overall settlement, a warning that he had also voiced in his last remarks on the Middle East in a 30 January Havana speech. He said in Cuba that the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement was a positive step but "only a partial measure of purely military character" and that the Geneva conference should carry out its mission of achieving a cardinal political settlement. Without mentioning the Suez disengagement accord in the current speech, Brezhnev cautioned that "against the background of a certain decrease in tensions, the aggressor and his patrons" might again try to avoid an overall settlement. It was not accidental, he said, that "ersatz plans" for a settlement had recently been launched, in effect replacing a general solution with "partial agreements of different kinds."

Brezhnev supported Syria's position that agreement on troop disengagement must be regarded as part of an overall Mideast settlement including complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories. A just peace, he reiterated, means Israeli withdrawal from lands occupied in 1967 "and later," insurance of security and sovereignty for all states in the region, and respect for the Palestinians' legitimate rights. He claimed that the Soviet Union consistently pursued this course in talks with the United States, coordinating its actions with the Arabs.

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Brezhnev again underscored Soviet concern to get the diplomatic action back to Geneva, asserting that a settlement "can and must be" worked out within the Geneva framework. He expressed appreciation that Syria shared the view--set out in the 7 March communique on Gromyko's talks in Damascus and repeated in the joint statement--that the Soviet Union should participate in "all stages" and "all fields" of a Mideast settlement.

Brezhnev appeared to pledge continued military assistance when he said, speaking of bilateral cooperation, that this "spread to the field of defense." Podgorny in his speech the following day also mentioned that new agreements to be signed in economic, technical and cultural cooperation would help in strengthening Syria's "defense capacity," and the joint statement made three references to Syrian defense in a similar vein.

**PODGORNYY SPEECH** In his luncheon speech on the 12th Podgornyy took up a common theme in current Soviet comment on the Mideast which has reflected Soviet misgivings over "liberalizing" political and economic trends in Egypt. He called for vigilance toward the intrigues of "imperialist and reactionary forces" in the present "acute political struggle" going on around a Middle East settlement. It is important, he said, that the current situation be assessed "correctly and realistically" and that one should see "all the concealed plots" and be able to see the difference between friends and allies. Echoing his call for vigilance, a Moscow commentary in Arabic on the 16th warned against machinations by Tel Aviv and its protecting forces which "appear to be seeking to establish peace" but are "drawing the Arabs into a trap" and imposing a settlement on their own terms.

Along the lines of the 7 March Gromyko communique, Podgornyy declared Soviet support for the Arabs' use of "all the means" of struggle to establish peace. The Soviet-Syrian joint statement tied this phrase to Syria's military strength, confirming the importance of strengthening Syria's "defense potential and its lawful, inalienable right to the use of all effective means" for liberation of its occupied lands.

**JOINT STATEMENT** The Soviet-Syrian statement was cast in an unusual format for a Soviet-Arab document, apparently to give it a more formal character. It was divided into sections under headings on Soviet-Syrian friendship, Middle

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East peace, and international security, preceded by what Damascus radio called a "preamble" and TASS described as an "official report" listing those participating in the talks and summing up al-Asad's activities.

The most notable substantive feature of the joint statement is the passage on detente. It pledges efforts by both parties to oppose attempts by "aggressive and reactionary circles" to complicate relations between states and aggravate the international situation, and affirms that "international relaxation" should become irreversible and be expanded to encompass areas dangerous for peace. This is apparently the first time that such a passage in support of detente has been included in a Soviet-Arab document. It would seem to signify that despite Moscow's displeasure at being cut out of the diplomatic activity for a Mideast settlement, the Soviet Union does not want the Arab-Israeli problem to affect adversely its overall relationship with the United States. In obtaining Syrian agreement to this passage, Moscow might also be replying indirectly to Egyptian accusations that the USSR believes detente should be restricted to the two superpowers, while small states should be under the tutelage of one or the other great power.

The section on "strong and invincible" Syrian-Soviet friendship contained the usual expressions of satisfaction with past cooperation and of interest in improving it in various fields, including unspecified steps for further strengthening Syria's "defense capacity."

The section of the statement on the Middle East was similar to the 7 March communique on Gromyko's talks in Syria.\* Thus it reiterated that peace cannot be achieved without full Israeli withdrawal and guarantee of the Palestinians' lawful "national" rights. Reviewing "steps being taken" to settle the conflict, the statement reaffirmed that troop disengagement must be part of an overall settlement including Israeli withdrawal; it did not include the call, in the March communique, for a timetable for withdrawal.

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\* Gromyko's visit to Syria is discussed in the TRENDS of 13 March 1974, pages 1-4.

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## INDOCHINA

## HANOI, PRG DENY THAT COMMUNISTS OVERRAN SOUTH VIETNAMESE BASE

A 13 April PRG Foreign Ministry statement promptly rejected Saigon charges that communist forces had overrun Tonle Cham base the day before and condemned South Vietnamese air strikes against the PRG-controlled area of Loc Ninh in retaliation for the alleged communist attack.\* The statement claimed that the base--located on the border of Binh Long and Tay Ninh provinces--had been shelled in response to ARVN "nibbling operations" and that the GVN troops finally withdrew "to avoid being used as scapegoats for the Nguyen Van Thieu clique's bellicose policy."

The PRG's version of the incident was endorsed in a DRV Foreign Ministry statement on the 16th. Later the same day, a spokesman for the DRV Foreign Ministry issued another statement assailing a 15 April statement by a U.S. State Department spokesman that the base had been attacked by North Vietnamese troops in "one of the most flagrant DRV violations" of the cease-fire since the peace agreement. The DRV spokesman reiterated that the GVN troops fled of their own accord and charged that Saigon had "fabricated the so-called attack" as an "excuse to escalate the war."

Communist reports claim that the South Vietnamese carried out bombing raids on the Loc Ninh area for four consecutive days--from the 12th to the 15th--and that schools, pagodas, and a hospital were hit.

Early reaction by Vietnamese communist broadcast media to the Saigon announcement it was suspending GVN participation in the Paris bilateral talks because of the Tonle Cham attacks was confined to a passing reference to the GVN's intention to walk out, in the 16 April DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement, as well as in a 17 April NHAN DAN commentary. The NHAN DAN commentator noted that Saigon had suspended the Paris negotiations "of its own volition" and reiterated standard charges of "intensified" U.S. military involvement in South Vietnam. A statement by the PRG Paris delegation--carried by VNA on the

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\* For background on earlier fighting at Tonle Cham, see the TRENDS of 28 March 1973, page 5.

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17th--called the Saigon suspension "a very serious and fully premeditated act" designed to sabotage the negotiations. It accused the United States of "openly inciting the Saigon administration to sabotage the talks and aggravate the war."

#### DRV DELEGATION ENDS TOUR WITH MOSCOW, PEKING STOPOVERS

A DRV delegation led by Premier Pham Van Dong returned home on 16 April, via Moscow and Peking, from a month-long series of official visits to Cuba, Algeria, Yugoslavia, and Sweden to thank those nations for their wartime aid.\* The deputy head of the delegation, Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, is not reported to have gone to Sweden. And according to Moscow media, Trinh arrived in the Soviet capital from Budapest on the 11th, the same day that Dong arrived from Sweden. Trinh had made a brief official visit to Hungary between the delegation's sojourns in Cuba and Algeria; the reason for his being in Budapest again has not been explained, and available DRV and Hungarian media have not reported any details of Trinh's second Budapest visit or his departure following it.

Soviet Premier Kosygin met with Dong and Trinh during their 11-13 April stopover in Moscow and held talks, in an atmosphere of "fraternal friendship and cordiality," on Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation, the situation in Vietnam, and "some international problems" of mutual concern. TASS and VNA accounts of the meeting did not indicate whether the issue of alleged violations of the Paris agreement was raised, but they did note that the Soviet side offered conventional assurances of "firm and consistent" support for DRV-PRG efforts to secure strict observance of the accord. The Soviets also reaffirmed their "high appraisal" of the 22 March PRG six-point proposal. Kosygin had similarly met with the DRV leaders on 20 March during the delegation's stopover on its way to Cuba.

During its 14-16 April stay in Peking the DRV delegation was duly feted on the 14th by Chou En-lai, who had a "very cordial and friendly" talk with the guests, according to NCNA. Dong and Trinh on the 15th called on Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's

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\* The delegation's stopover in Moscow en route to Cuba was discussed in the TRENDS of 27 March 1974, page 20, and the visit to Cuba in the TRENDS of 3 April 1974, pages 11-12.

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mother, Queen Kossamak, and had lunch with RGNU Prime Minister Penn Nouth. The Cambodian Front delegation presently visiting China, led by insurgent forces chief Khieu Samphan, had left Peking for a tour of the provinces on the 14th prior to the DRV delegation's arrival, and Sihanouk had left Peking for North Korea on the 11th.

As was the case during the DRV delegation's passage through Peking en route to Cuba, Chou En-lai failed to attend airport ceremonies on its arrival or departure; Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien was the top PRC official present. Last October Chou had also failed to make his usual appearance at such airport ceremonies when Dong stopped in Peking on his way to East Europe; however, Chou did greet Dong upon his return through the Chinese capital on 4 November.

#### HANOI CITY PARTY CONGRESS ELECTS NEW SECRETARY

The holding of the sixth congress of the Hanoi municipal party organization from 8 to 12 April, reported by Hanoi radio on the 14th, brings to the fore the question of when the fourth Vietnam Workers Party Congress will be held.\* It would seem likely that the Hanoi congress--the pacesetter for party organizations throughout the DRV--will be followed shortly by other local party congresses.

The Hanoi city party gathering devoted extensive attention to economic restoration, agriculture, and management tasks; elected a new executive committee of the municipal party organization; and named Nguyen Lam, a member of the VWP Central Committee, to the new executive committee. Lam replaces Secretary Nguyen Van Tran, who "has been given a new assignment by the party Central Committee," according to the first Hanoi account, which did not specify Tran's new position. The first Hanoi report on the congress gave no indication that any VWP Politburo members attended, although Premier Pham Van Dong addressed the fifth Hanoi party congress in April 1971.

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\* The date for the VWP's last congress, the third, held in early September 1960 immediately after observance of the DRV's national day on 2 September, was announced in March of that year, and pre-congress preparations, including the issuance of new party statutes, were publicized throughout the spring and summer of that year.

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Some indication of the timing of local preparations for the Hanoi municipal party congress was evident in the following: the city party newspaper HANOI MOI announced on 19 March that Hanoi districts and wards had completed between 11 and 18 March the organizing of congresses of local party delegates to discuss the draft political report for the municipal congress, review 1973 tasks and the local tasks for 1974, and elect delegates to the Hanoi municipal congress. Thus, about one month elapsed between local preparations and the holding of the Hanoi congress.

## CONGRESS PROCEEDINGS

Outgoing Hanoi municipal VWP Secretary Nguyen Van Tran delivered the main report at the congress, according to Hanoi radio, and dwelt on the situation over the past three years and the tasks for the coming two years. The short summary of his report available and reportage on the congress' activities suggest that most emphasis was on economic matters and management. The congress reviewed "shortcomings in economic management" and adopted five "major tasks" for 1974 and 1975, including overcoming the war's consequences, restoring and developing the economy and culture, socialist construction, and others dealing with improving management and leadership. The congress also stressed the need to "vigorously develop agriculture" to supply Hanoi's food needs and to solve "urgent problems" in living conditions, food, housing, and the like.

The Hanoi congress elected a new executive committee composed of 35 permanent and 16 alternate members, the radio noted, pointing out that 10 of these are economic management cadres, scientific and technical cadres, and young cadres working in the economy. Hanoi's first report on the election of Nguyen Lam to the new executive committee did not specify that he was replacing Tran, although the juxtaposition of their reassessments implied as much.

The first available confirmation that Nguyen Lam also is secretary of the Hanoi municipal party committee came in Hanoi's list of officials greeting Premier Pham Van Dong's arrival back in Hanoi on 16 April after his European tour. Nguyen Van Tran, last identified as secretary of the Hanoi city party committee on 2 April, was identified only in his other position as a member of the VWP Central Committee Secretariat in the same listing of those welcoming home Dong.

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A 2 April announcement of changes in government positions had noted that Nguyen Lam was giving up his chairmanship of the State Planning Commission and the State Price Commission in order to assume an unspecified "new assignment."\*

Nguyen Lam had previously held the post of Hanoi party secretary in the early 1960's; he was identified in that position as late as December 1966. In February 1967 Nguyen Van Tran evidently took over the party post at the same time that it was announced that he was relinquishing his job as minister of heavy industry. Nguyen Lam has not had a very active public role since 1966, but he served from 1967 to 1969 as vice minister of light industry, and in December 1969 he gave up that post to become a minister and vice chairman of the State Planning Commission. He was given the chairmanship of the Price Commission in 1971 and became the head of the Planning Commission in June 1973.

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\* The 2 April announcement, contained in a communique of the DRV National Assembly Standing Committee, is discussed in a supplementary article in the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages S1-S3.

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## YUGOSLAVIA

## TITO REGISTERS DEFIANCE TO "PRESSURES" FROM ABROAD

President Tito has added his authoritative voice for the first time to the current chorus of Yugoslav defiance against foreign "pressures" and Italian claims to the Yugoslav-administered "Zone B" area south of Trieste. Speaking on 15 April to a meeting of the Sarajevo political aktiv preparatory to the LCY congress, Tito reflected sensitivity about those who would seek to exploit potential Yugoslav disarray under conditions of Tito's disability or death. The Yugoslav leader charged that those exerting pressure from abroad "constantly wait for something to happen in Yugoslavia, for it to split and break up," hoping that they will "get something." He went on immediately to characterize the border dispute with Italy as a type of pressure and reiterated the standard Belgrade position on the border dispute with Rome. While voicing hope for good relations with Italy and denying any intent to indulge in "sabre-rattling," he portrayed the dispute with Rome as a lasting "scar" on the two countries' relations and strongly asserted Yugoslav sovereignty over the disputed zone. The Yugoslavs, he declared, view the territory in question not as Zone B but as an integral part of the Slovenian republic. He went on to observe that the dispute involved not only Italy but also NATO, terming it "not an accident that [in March] the Americans held these maneuvers with them there, that is, here in the Adriatic under our noses, at our border."

Tito seemed concerned to refute the notion that Yugoslav fears the Soviet Union. Such a fear had been suggested by recent Yugoslav commentaries which cited Czechoslovak defector Sejna's claims--voiced in an interview aired on Austrian TV in February--of a detailed Soviet plan to invade Yugoslavia following Tito's demise. Tito referred to "other pressures" and to propaganda in the Western and Austrian press. In an "authorized" version of his speech carried by TANJUG, but not in the Belgrade radio recording of the speech, Tito was quoted as following the reference to the Western press by saying:

For instance there are also some calculations against the Soviet Union here. They try to frighten us with the Soviet Union and constantly talk about a great danger threatening us from that side. I know for certain that we do not need to fear the Soviet Union.

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As far back as the time of the war Soviet troops have been in Hungary. And when we were in the most difficult situation, in our quarrels with Stalin, when Stalin threatened us with troops, we were not afraid. We were preparing ourselves in the necessary manner, and in case of need we would have defended ourselves. Now we have good relations with the Soviet Union. We have a tremendous amount of foreign trade with it. We have very good relations with Hungary.

While Yugoslav media have in the past complained about joint Soviet-Hungarian maneuvers in Hungary, they have not commented on recent extensive military activities there. Observers of maneuvers in March had included Lt. Gen. Andryushchenko, the Warsaw Pact high command representative in Hungary. And on 26-28 March Budapest was the site of a Warsaw Pact Military Council session presided over by Pact Commander Yakubovskiy. Presumably to reassure Belgrade, the early March exercises were followed up with a visit to Yugoslavia by Hungarian Defense Minister Czinege, who had talks with Tito on, among other things, "the broadening relations of the armies" of the two countries.

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## FRENCH ELECTIONS

## MOSCOW RANKS FRENCH CANDIDATES: CHABAN, MITTERRAND, GISCARD

Although Moscow's general coverage of the French presidential election campaign has continued to be confined for the most part to brief, factual, and relatively straightforward reportage, some comment has made increasingly clear Moscow's caution in treating the possibility of a Mitterrand victory and the resulting unknown effect this would have on Soviet relations with France and Europe.\* This was clearly demonstrated in the weekly Moscow domestic radio observers roundtable discussion program of 14 April, which in effect revealed Moscow's implied preference for the relatively known quantity of a Gaullist victory in the person of Chaban-Delmas and seemed to rank Mitterrand and Giscard d'Estaing after Chaban, in that order.

Coming two days after Mitterrand's 12 April press conference, in which he touched upon future French policy toward Europe, NATO, CSCE, and MBFR if he became president, the roundtable discussion refrained from commenting on the leftist candidate's foreign policy remarks, while readily evaluating Chaban and Giscard in this field. Regarding Chaban, LIFE ABROAD deputy chief editor G. Kuznetsov favorably observed that Chaban had stated that he would follow de Gaulle's foreign policy of "independence in all forms," including the further development of Soviet-French cooperation. On the other hand, Kuznetsov followed with a comment on Giscard portraying him as trying to establish a presidential majority around Independent Republicans and centrists, who are "ardent Atlantists and supporters of the political, not just economic, unification of the Common Market countries"--attributes that are damning in the vernacular of the Soviet media. But as regards the foreign policy remarks of Mitterrand, who had so conveniently opened the door for the discussion, there was a striking silence by the roundtable participants.

While Moscow has commented favorably on the leftist Joint Program, it has entirely ignored the foreign policy aspects, limiting its remarks to innocuous replays of PCF leaders' statements suggesting that implementation of the program would alleviate such internal French economic difficulties as inflation and unemployment.

\* See the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 3-4, for initial Moscow reaction to President Pompidou's death.

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## EUROPE

## MOSCOW SEES "MONOPOLIES" BEHIND U.S.-EC DIFFERENCES

Moscow has been performing a delicate balancing act in the comment it has offered on U.S.-European differences over the past half-year. On the one hand, it has presented these developments as a positive phenomenon, testifying to the willingness of the European countries to stand up to the United States, and hence--given Moscow's view of the issues, such as the Middle East--to stand up for peace. On the other hand, it has stressed the undiminished strength of the forces of reaction in the Western world, and it has interpreted some of the European actions, particularly the drive for European defense cooperation, as motivated by these sinister forces. An article in the 3 April LITERATURNAYA GAZETA attempts to square the circle in this regard by suggesting that the U.S.-dominated "multinational monopolies" lie behind all the troubles in the Western world, exacerbating both the divisions among the European countries and between the European countries and the United States.

## THE MONOPOLIES

The article, written by veteran European commentator N. Molchanov, like virtually all recent Soviet comment on U.S.-European differences, is stronger on imagery than logic. It likens the "crisis" in the Western world to the decline envisioned by Spengler and notes that Marxists have long predicted it. The root cause of the problem, it says, is economic, and the culprits are the multinational monopolies which "have refined to the highest degree the parasitic art of extracting profits." Although the article asserts that "all West Europe's present disorders" can be ascribed to the machinations of the monopolies, it offers no explanation of how this is supposed to have taken place.

The article is a little clearer in explaining the alleged relationship between the activities of the monopolies and the current strains in U.S.-European relations. It implies that the European revolt against U.S. "tutelage" is in effect a revolt against the domination of the multinational monopolies, long known to be controlled by U.S. interests. Thus it says the links between U.S. firms and the multinational monopolies provided the "background against which the strongest outbursts of anti-Americanism in West Europe erupted."

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CSCE      Summing up this preliminary analysis with the bland assertion that the conflicts between the United States and the European countries are an "inevitable phenomenon arising out of the very nature of capitalism," the article goes on to suggest that the CSCE offers a way out of the crisis. It asserts that the talks in Geneva have reached a crucial stage on which the outcome of the entire conference depends. While it professes optimism about the prospects for agreement, it warns of the "stubborn efforts" being made to entangle the talks in the contradictions of the Atlantic alliance, the Common Market, the energy crisis, and the Middle East conflict. It describes as a "vestige of the cold war" the "hullabaloo in the Western press" about the free exchange of persons and ideas, asserting that it concealed a desire to frustrate the achievement of agreements. The article is equally emphatic in insisting that not the " slightest ambiguity" could be allowed regarding the principle of the inviolability of borders.

THE FRENCH CONNECTION      One of the more notable features of the article and a sign of its topical character is the great stress it places on the importance of Franco-Soviet relations as a foundation stone of European security. The article gives unstinting praise to General de Gaulle and the independent line he introduced into French foreign policy. It recalls with approval his decision to withdraw France from the NATO military system, and it condemns those who are now allegedly pressuring France to abandon the "independent Gaullist line of its foreign policy and return to 'orthodox Atlantism.'" It gives equal praise to Pompidou and recalls that France, along with the Soviet Union, played an "enormous role" in bringing about the CSCE talks. It asserts that the continued cooperation of the two countries is of "no less significance" in insuring the successful completion of the talks.

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## U S S R

## KOMMUNIST CHIEF EDITOR REMOVED AMID SIGNS OF DISGRACE

The circumstances surrounding the mid-January removal of A. G. Yegorov as chief editor of the CPSU Central Committee's key party journal, KOMMUNIST, suggest that he was fired suddenly in disgrace. The likelihood that Yegorov's ouster was precipitate was clearly indicated by the fact no successor was named at the time of his removal and that KOMMUNIST has remained without a chief editor for more than two months. His removal evidently caused some delay and disarray in celebrating the journal's 50th anniversary that fell on 5 April. While the immediate cause of Yegorov's removal as KOMMUNIST chief editor remains unclear, an article by him in the November 1973 literary journal ZNAMYA may have outraged conservatives by its strikingly undogmatic formulations on culture and nationalism.

Yegorov, a 54-year-old philosopher, was last listed as chief editor of KOMMUNIST in issue No. 1 for 1974, signed to the press on 14 January. The succeeding three issues, covering February and March, list no chief editor in the masthead. There have been no other changes in the membership of the editorial board.

Evidence of disarray ensuing from Yegorov's removal surfaced in the confused and uncoordinated handling by the Soviet central and regional press of KOMMUNIST's 50th anniversary, which according to Soviet calendars was scheduled to be celebrated on 5 April. Although the less prominent journal PLANNED ECONOMY had been awarded an Order of the Red Banner on its 50th anniversary on 18 March, as reported in the 19 March PRAVDA, no award for the prestigious KOMMUNIST was announced on its anniversary. In fact, the entire central press--except for the twice-weekly paper SOVIET CULTURE--completely ignored the 5 April anniversary. The 5 April SOVIET CULTURE ran a long anniversary article stressing KOMMUNIST's role as a reliable guide in literature and art and indicating that the April issue would be the jubilee issue. Yet, when PRAVDA on 6 April routinely announced the appearance of issue No. 5, its description of the contents did not mention the anniversary.

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Moscow's silence was underscored by the fact that a few regional papers--apparently uninformed of Moscow's decision to ignore the anniversary--on 5 April ran a NOVOSTI agency article on the journal's anniversary. This article, by Aleksandr Bakin, was published in LENINGRADSKAYA PRAVDA, SOVETSKAYA KIRGIZIYA, SOVETSKAYA LITVA, and TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA. The Bakin article struck an odd note, stressing the usually ignored 20th CPSU Congress, "in the work of which the question of overcoming the cult of personality occupied an important place" and after which, it declared, the journal had improved its work.

On 16 April Moscow radio finally reported a belated message of congratulations from the Central Committee to the KOMMUNIST editorial board on its anniversary. The message stressed that a "high party attitude and uncompromising struggle against bourgeois ideology and right and left revisionism" are "characteristic" of KOMMUNIST articles.

NOVEMBER ARTICLE      Although there has been no recent public criticism of Yegorov, he may have come under fire for expressing unorthodox views in his article on art and its national and international manifestations that appeared in ZNAMYA's November issue. Avoiding a narrowminded or simplistic approach and customary stereotypes about the need for party loyalty and ideological struggle, Yegorov dealt with the touchy subjects of artistic freedom, cultural exchanges and slavophilism. He discussed art in terms of its value for all mankind, rather than as "class" art, cited talent and originality as criteria for an artist's work rather than ideological criteria, and declared that progressive art is not limited only to works of socialist realism.\* He argued that the scientific-technical revolution and detente increase the need for exchange of "artistic valuables" with the West. While chiding slavophiles for their nationalistic idealizing of the "archaic," he defended the features of nationalities against "leftists" and their "national nihilism" and insisted that despite what internationalistic extremists say, nations and national languages are not dying out in the Soviet Union. Yegorov previously had written articles on art and nationality--in a mid-1954 QUESTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY and in June 1956 and March 1960 issues of KOMMUNIST--as well as a number of books on art and esthetics.

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\* For a discussion of the appearance of this modernist-traditionalist dispute in the social sciences, see the TRENDS Supplementary Article of 3 April 1974, "Challenge to Party Domination of Soviet Social Sciences."

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Yegorov's article, with its undogmatic approach and frequent use of the term "all-human" in discussing the value of artistic works, contrasted sharply with an article by ideological hard-liner V. N. Yagodkin, Moscow gorkom ideology secretary, that appeared in KOMMUNIST shortly after Yegorov's removal--in issue No. 3, signed to press in mid-February. Yagodkin complained of increasing efforts by bourgeois propagandists, revisionists and opportunists to label one-sided the class approach to social phenomena and to "replace it with an abstract, 'all-human'" approach. He did not deal specifically with the subject matter of Yegorov's article, however.

Yegorov's article also appears at variance with the views of KOMMUNIST deputy chief editor E. A. Bagramov. As reported in issue No. 2 of the journal RECENT AND MOST RECENT HISTORY, Bagramov delivered a speech in late October 1973 on the "Marxist-Leninist theory of national relations and the present ideological struggle," stressing the class approach and declaring that conflict between socialist and capitalist views of national relations is "sharper than ever before."

## YEGOROV'S CAREER

Yegorov originally joined KOMMUNIST in 1952 at the age of 32 as deputy chief and then chief of one of its departments. After serving as chief editor of the journal POLITICAL SELF-EDUCATION from 1956 to 1961, he rose to deputy head of Agitprop under Khrushchev's ideological chief, L. F. Illichev. In July 1962, shortly after V. P. Stepanov replaced a Stalinist, F. V. Konstantinov, as KOMMUNIST chief editor, Yegorov joined the journal's editorial board. Yegorov also became a member of the Central Committee's Ideological Commission when it was created by Khrushchev in late 1962.

When the ideological apparatus was reorganized in 1965 after Khrushchev's fall, Stepanov was demoted and Yegorov appointed KOMMUNIST chief editor. However, there were signs of opposition to him prior to his appointment. In June 1965, while Yegorov was deputy Agitprop head and a member of KOMMUNIST's editorial board and Stepanov was chief editor, a cartoon in the journal PARTY LIFE depicted a character named "Yegorov," who was about to sharply criticize a character named "Stepanov" but who then changed his mind for opportunistic reasons and eulogized "Stepanov" instead. In December of the same year Yegorov became chief editor of the journal and Stepanov was demoted to a member of the board. Soon afterward, in late March 1966, PARTY LIFE chief editor Ye. I. Bugayev was removed and transferred to deputy chief editor of KOMMUNIST under Yegorov, whom he had appeared to criticize in 1965. Bugayev and Stepanov have remained on the board ever since.

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## CHINA

## REHABILITATED CADRE NAMED TO PLA-VACATED KWANGTUNG POSTS

A 15 April NCNA report on the opening of the Canton trade fair identified Chao Tzu-yang as Kwangtung first party secretary and chairman of the provincial revolutionary committee. Chao's promotion to provincial chief provides dramatic testimony to the success of Chou En-lai's party-oriented coalition, in divesting the PLA of the civil administrative tasks it inherited during the turmoil of the cultural revolution and in restoring rehabilitated civilian cadres to power. Chao, Kwangtung party chief prior to the cultural revolution, is the first person named to fill one of the vacant provincial party first secretary slots left by the transfer of all military region (MR) commanders who were also provincial party chiefs at the end of 1973.

Chao's appointment is especially significant in that the new Canton MR commander is Politburo member Hsu Shih-yu, who had enjoyed the top military, party, and government posts in Kiangsu before he took command of the Canton MR. Hsu's failure to regain civilian authority over his new base suggests that the other rotated commanders, who are mostly of lesser rank, are unlikely to emerge as party chiefs in their new provinces. Moreover, the political future of at least one recently transferred MR commander appears to be even more troubled. Han Hsien-chu, commander of the Lanchow MR, has not made a public appearance since his transfer was announced early last January. Han was also the apparent target of a recent RED FLAG article attacking regional supporters of a war memoir praising Lin Piao.\*

Chao Tzu-yang had slipped from public view in 1966 at the time of Red Guard attacks. He was charged with being a follower of Tao Chu, the purged head of the former Central-South Bureau, and with making mistakes in carrying out several rural work programs. Chao did not appear again until 1971, when he surfaced in Inner Mongolia as a secretary on the newly rebuilt provincial party committee. He moved to Canton in March 1972 as a vice chairman of the Kwangtung provincial revolutionary committee and was identified as a provincial party secretary in January 1973.

Chao's regaining of control over his old provincial bailiwick appears to be responsive to recently intensified media calls to correctly

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\* For a discussion see the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages 24-25.

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distinguish between aiming the anti-Confucius struggle more directly at a relatively small number of cadres designated as diehard followers of Lin Piao, while allowing "a second chance" to cadres who have corrected their mistakes. An unusually frank Chengchow broadcast on 10 April, for example, called for "punishing" those who opposed the cultural revolution, but at the same time firmly declared that a majority of cadres criticized during the cultural revolution should be allowed "to atone for their mistakes through meritorious service." In a sweeping statement with far-reaching implications for speeding the rehabilitation of many cultural revolution casualties, the broadcast stated that "we must realistically appraise all those cadres who were criticized and struggled against" during the cultural revolution. The majority of these cadres were said to realize that the cultural revolution "redeemed them" and that criticism from the masses "did them much good."

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NOTE

MOSCOW ON PRC DISARMAMENT ROLE: Moscow appeared to move a step closer to requiring Chinese participation in multilateral arms control agreements at the opening session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva on 16 April. Soviet representative Aleksey Roshchin's opening remarks, as reported by TASS, included a call for "enlisting in the negotiations on disarmament all militarily powerful countries, including all nuclear powers and, first and foremost, the Chinese People's Republic whose negative stand provides one of the major obstacles to the implementation of disarmament programs." Moscow has been persistently vague about Chinese participation in the past, but there have been signs of a possible reevaluation of this posture over the past year. Roshchin raised Western eyebrows in his speech to the opening session of the disarmament conference last year on 20 February by arguing that "it is necessary for all nuclear powers to take part in talks on ending nuclear tests." Several Soviet arms control observers have in recent months reiterated Brezhnev's remarks in his World Peace Congress speech on 26 October 1973 which seemed also to reflect concern about China. Brezhnev had said: "It is clear that the struggle to prevent nuclear war cannot for long be reduced to the efforts of two states alone, especially if others, first and foremost other nuclear powers, continue to build up these arms."

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## APPENDIX

### MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 8 - 14 APRIL 1974

<u>Moscow (2856 items)</u>		<u>Peking (803 items)</u>	
Syrian President al-Asad in USSR	(--) 9%	UNGA Special Session [Teng Hsiao-ping	(--) 35% [Brezhnev Speech (--) 2%]
UNGA Special Session [Gromyko Arrival	(--) 8% (--) 5%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(5%) 8%
Remarks, UNGA Speech	(1%) 8%	Cambodia	(28%) 7%
Indochina [Kosygin Meeting With DRV Leaders in Moscow	(--) 4%	[Sihanouk in DPRK Lao Coalition	(--) 2% (9%) 3%
[Lao Coalition Government	(1%) 3%	Government	
China	(7%) 5%		
Bangladesh Premier Rahman in USSR	(--) 3%		
Warsaw Pact Meeting	(--) 2%		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthly item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.